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Abstract
An interesting formal approach to specify component interfaces is interface automata based approach,
which is proposed by L. Alfaro and T. Henzinger. These formalisms have the ability to model both the
input and output requirements of components system. In this paper, we propose a method to enrich
interface automata by the semantics of actions in order to verify components interoperability at the levels
of signatures, semantics, and protocol interactions of actions. These interfaces consist of a set of required
and oﬀered actions speciﬁed by Pre and Post conditions. The veriﬁcation of the compatibility between
interface automata reuse the L.Alfaro and T.Henzinger proposed algorithm and adapt it by taking into
account the action semantics. Our approach is illustrated by a case study of the vehicle CyCab.
Keywords: component based systems, interface compatibility, I/O automata.
1 Introduction
Interface formalisms play a central role in the component-based design of many
types of systems. They are increasingly used thanks to their ability to describe, in
terms of communicating interfaces, how a component of a system can be composed
and connected to the others. An interface should describe enough information about
the manner of making two or more components working together properly. Several
approaches and models based on components have been proposed notably those of
Szyperski [10] and Medvidovic [7]. Most of these models specify the components
behaviors, the connectors ensuring their communications and the services provided
or requested. Assembling components is performed by passing through diﬀerent
levels of abstraction, from the conception of the software architectures ADL until the
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implementation using platforms like CORBA, Fractal or .NET. The crucial question
that arises to the developers is to know if the proposed assembling is correct or not.
In this paper, our interests concern components which are described by interface
automata. These interfaces specify action protocols: scheduling calls of component
actions. As some related works, we can mention the model in [3] where the protocols
are associated to the component connectors. Others works as the ones in [9], the
authors proposed a comparison between models at three grades of interoperability
using the operation signatures, the interfaces protocols and the quality of service.
The protocols in [6] based on transitions systems and concurrency including the
reachability analysis. The composition operation is essential to deﬁne assembly
and check the surety and vivacity properties. The approach in [8] aims to endow
the UML components to specify interaction protocols between components. The
behavioral description language is based on hierarchical automata inspired from
StateCharts. It supports composition and reﬁnement mechanisms of system be-
haviors. The system properties are speciﬁed in temporal logic. In [4], the authors
deﬁne a component-based model Kmelia with abstract services, which does not take
into account the data during the interaction. The behavior described by automata
associated to services. This environment uses the tool MEC model-checker to verify
the compatibility of components. Other works consider real-time constraints [5].
The idea is to determine the component characteristics and deﬁne certain criteria
to verify the compatibility of their speciﬁcations using the tool Kronos.
The works of L.Alfaro and T.Henzinger [1,2], allows to specify component in-
terfaces by interface automata. These interfaces are speciﬁed by automata which
are labelled by input, output, and internal actions. The composition of interfaces is
achieved by synchronizing actions. Our approach reuse this model and strengthen-
ing it by taking into account the action semantics to ensure a more reliable veriﬁca-
tion of components interoperability. The paper is organized as follows: In section 2,
we describe the interface automata as well as the deﬁnitions and the algorithm used
to verify the compatibility between component interfaces. In section 3, we present
our approach to verify the interface compatibility, and we apply the approach to
the case study of the vehicle CyCab in section 4. We conclude our work and present
perspectives in section 5.
2 Input/Output Automata
The I/O automata are deﬁned by Nancy A.Lynch and Mark.Tutle [12] as a labelled
transition systems.Commonly, they are used to model distributed and concurrent
systems. Labels of I/O automata fall into three categories of actions: input, output,
and hidden actions where input actions are enabled at every state of an automaton.
Deﬁnition 2.1 An I/O automaton A = 〈SA, IA,ΣIA,ΣOA,ΣHA , δA〉 consists of
• a ﬁnite set SA of states;
• a subset of initial states IA ⊆ SA;
• three disjoint sets ΣIA,Σ
O
Aand Σ
H
A of inputs, output, and hidden actions. All
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actions, as a whole, are denoted by ΣA = ΣIA ∪ ΣOA ∪ ΣHA ;
• a set δA ⊆ SA × ΣA × SA of transitions. It gives a transition relation with the
property that for every state s and an input action a there is a transition (s, a,
s) in δA.
2.1 Interface automata
The formalism of interface automata are introduced by L.Alfaro and T.Henzinger
[1,2], to model component interfaces. These automata are I/O automata where it is
not necessary to enable input actions at every state. Every component is described
by one interface automaton. In an interface automaton, output actions deﬁne the
called actions by a component in his environment. They describe the required
actions of a component. They are labelled by the symbole ”!”. Input actions
describe the oﬀered actions of a component. They are labelled by the symbole
”?”. Internal (or hidden) actions are enabled actions inside a component by the
component himself. They are labelled by the symbole ”;”.
Both for I/O automata (IOAs) and interface automata (IAs), the input and
output actions of an automaton A are called external actions uniformly (ΣextA =
ΣIA ∪ ΣOA) while output actions and internal actions are called locally-controlled
actions (ΣlocA = Σ
O
A ∪ ΣHA ). We deﬁne by ΣIA(s), ΣOA(s), ΣHA (s) the input, output,
and internal actions enabled at the state s.
Deﬁnition 2.2 An interface automaton A = 〈SA, IA,ΣIA,ΣOA,ΣHA , δA〉 consists of
• a ﬁnite set SA of states;
• an subset of initial states IA ⊆ SA. It contains at most one state. If IA = ∅,
then A is called empty;
• three disjoint sets ΣIA,Σ
O
A and Σ
H
A of inputs, output, and hidden actions;
• a set δA ⊆ SA×ΣA×SA of transitions between states. Contrarily to I/O automata,
the input actions are not necessarily enabled at every state.
The optimistic view of interface automata incorporates a notion of interface com-
position that leads to smaller compound automata than the input-enabled view.
When we compose two interface automata, the resulting composite automaton may
contain illegal states, where one automaton issues an output that is not acceptable
as input in the other one. The proposed approach to compute compatibility between
interface automata based on the fact that each interface expects the environment
to provide only legal inputs. The compound interface expects the environment to
pass over transitions leading only to legal states. The existence of a such legal en-
vironment for the composition of two interfaces indicates that there is a way to use
their corresponding components together by ensuring the encounter of their envi-
ronment assumptions. The composite interface automaton combines the behaviors
of the two component interfaces and the environment assumptions under which the
components can work together properly.
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2.1.1 Composition and Compatibility
In this section we present the approach of L.Alfaro a T.Henzinger [1,2] to verify
the compatibility of components which are speciﬁed by interface automata. The
following deﬁnition presents the composition of two interface automata.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Two interface automata A1 and A2 are composable if
ΣIA1 ∩ ΣIA2 = ΣOA1 ∩ ΣOA2 = ΣHA1 ∩ ΣA2 = ΣHA2 ∩ ΣA1 = ∅
Shared(A1,A2) = (ΣIA1 ∩ ΣOA2) ∪ (ΣIA2 ∩ ΣOA1) is the set of shared actions between
A1 and A2. We can now deﬁne the product automaton A1 ⊗A2 properly.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let A1 and A2 be two composable interface automata. The product
A1 ⊗A2 is deﬁned by
• SA1⊗A2 = SA1 × SA2 and IA1⊗A2 = IA1 × IA2 ;
• ΣIA1⊗A2 = (Σ
I
A1
∪ ΣIA2) \ Shared(A1, A2);
• ΣOA1⊗A2 = (Σ
O
A1
∪ ΣOA2) \ Shared(A1, A2);
• ΣHA1⊗A2 = Σ
H
A1
∪ ΣHA2 ∪ Shared(A1, A2);
• ((s1, s2), a, (s′1, s′2)) ∈ δA1⊗A2 if
· a 
∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ (s1, a, s′1) ∈ δA1 ∧ s2 = s′2
· a 
∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ (s2, a, s′2) ∈ δA2 ∧ s1 = s′1
· a ∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ (s1, a, s′1) ∈ δA1 ∧ (s2, a, s′2) ∈ δA2 .
The incompatibility between two composable interface automata is due to the ex-
istence of some states (s1,s2) in the product where one of the automata outputs a
shared action sa from the state s1 which is not accepted as input from the state s2
or vice versa. These states are called illegal states.
Deﬁnition 2.5 Given two composable interface automata A1 and A2, the set of
illegal states Illegal(A1, A2) ⊆ SA1 × SA2 of A1 ⊗A2 is deﬁned by {(s1, s2) ∈ SA1 ×
SA2 |∃a ∈ Shared(A1, A2). (a ∈ ΣOA1(s1) ∧ a 
∈ ΣIA2(s2)) ∨ (a ∈ ΣOA2(s2) ∧ a 
∈
ΣIA1(s1))}.
The reachability of states in Illegal(A1, A2) do not implies that A1 and A2 are not
compatible. The existence of an environment E that produces appropriate inputs
for the product A1 ⊗A2 ensures that illegal states will not be entered and then A1
and A2 can be used together. The compatible states, denoted by Comp(A1,A2),
are states from which the environment can prevent entering illegal states. The
compatibility can be deﬁned diﬀerently, A1 and A2 are compatible if and only if
their initial state is compatible.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Given two compatible interface automata A1 and A2. The compos-
tion A1 ‖ A2 is an interface automaton deﬁned by: (i) SA1‖A2 = Comp(A1,A2),
(ii) the initial state is IA1‖A2 = IA1⊗A2 ∩ Comp(A1,A2), (iii) ΣA1‖A2 = ΣA1⊗A2,
and (iv) the set of transitions is δA1‖A2 = δA1⊗A2 ∩ (Comp(A1,A2) × ΣA1‖A2 ×
Comp(A1,A2)).
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In this approach, the veriﬁcation of the compatibility between a component C1 and
a component C2 is obtained by verifying the compatibility between their interface
automata A1 and A2. The veriﬁcation steps of the compatibility between A1 and
A2 are listed below.
Algorithm
Input : interface automata A1, A2
Output : A1 ‖ A2
Algorithm steps:
(i) verify that A1 and A2 are composable,
(ii) calculate the product A1 ×A2,
(iii) calculate the set of illegal in A1 ×A2,
(iv) calculate the bad states in A1 × A2 : the states from which the illegal state
are reachable by enabling only the internal action or the output actions (one
suppose the existence of a helpful environment),
(v) Calculate A1 ‖ A2 by eliminating from the automaton A1 × A2, the illegal
state, the bad state, and the unreachable states from the initial states,
(vi) after performing the above step, if the automaton A1 ‖ A2 is empty then the
interface automata A1, A2 are not compatible, therefore C1 and C2 can not be
assembled correctly in any environment. Otherwise A1 and A2 are compatible.
The complexity of this approach is in time linear on |A1| and |A2| [1].
3 Considering action semantics in the veriﬁcation of
interface automata compatibility
In this section, we present an approach to verify the compatibility between com-
ponent interfaces based on the I/O automata and the approach of L.Alfaro and
T.Henzinger [1].The contribution of our approach compared to the one presented in
[1], is the consideration of the action semantics in the component interfaces and in
the veriﬁcation of the component compatibility. In [1], one verify component com-
patibility by considering only action signatures. We consider, that action signatures
are not suﬃcient to decide on the component compatibility using an approach based
on I/O automata.
We propose to annotate transitions in an interface automaton by pre and post
conditions of actions. We adapt the compatibility veriﬁcation algorithm presented
in [1], to take into account pre and post of actions. In the following deﬁnitions we
formalise the adaptations on the L.Alfaro and T.Henzinger approach in order to
introduce action semantics in the interface automata.
We introduce a ﬁnite set of variables x ∈ V with their respective domain Dx.
These variables are used to represent the eﬀect of actions by updating there values.
The variable updates are modeled by pre and post atomic formulas over V.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let A = 〈SA, IA,ΣIA,ΣOA,ΣHA , P reA, PostA, δA〉 be an IA strength-
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ened by action semantics where
• a ﬁnite set SA of states;
• an initial state IA ⊆ SA;
• three disjoint sets ΣIA,Σ
O
Aand Σ
H
A of inputs, output, and hidden actions;
• Pre and Post are the set of pre and post-conditions of actions, they are atomic
formulae over the set of variables V;
• a set δA ⊆ SA × PreA × ΣA × PostA × SA of transitions.
For a ∈ ΣA, we denote by PreAa and PostQa respectively the precondition and
post-condition of the action a in the automaton A.
The composition condition is the same as the preexisting approach. The composi-
tion of two automata may take eﬀect only if their actions are disjoint, except shared
input and output actions between them. When we compose them, shared actions
are synchronized and all the others are interleaved asynchronously.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let A1 and A2 be two composable interface automata. The product
A1 ⊗A2 is deﬁned by
• SA1⊗A2 = SA1 × SA2 and IA1⊗A2 = IA1 × IA2 ;
• ΣIA1⊗A2 = (Σ
I
A1
∪ ΣIA2) \ Shared(A1, A2);
• ΣOA1⊗A2 = (Σ
O
A1
∪ ΣOA2) \ Shared(A1, A2);
• ΣHA1⊗A2 = Σ
H
A1
∪ ΣHA2 ∪ Shared(A1, A2);
• ((q1, q2), P re, a, Post, (q′1, q′2)) ∈ δA1⊗A2 if
· a 
∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ (q1, P re1, a, Post1, q′1) ∈ δA1 ∧ q2 = q′2 ∧ Pre ≡
Pre1 ∧ Post ≡ Post1
· a 
∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ (q2, P re2, a, Post2, q′2) ∈ δA2 ∧ q1 = q′1 ∧ Pre ≡
Pre2 ∧ Post ≡ Post2
· a ∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ ((q1, P re1, a, Post1, q′1) ∈ δA1 ∧ a ∈ ΣIA1) ∧
((q2, P re2, a, Post2, q′2) ∈ δA2 ∧ a ∈ ΣOA2) ∧ Pre ≡ Pre2 ∧ Post ≡ Post1
such that Pre2 ⇒ Pre1 ∧ Post1 ⇒ Post2
· a ∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ ((q1, P re1, a, Post1, q′1) ∈ δA1 ∧ a ∈ ΣOA1) ∧
((q2, P re2, a, Post2, q′2) ∈ δA2 ∧ a ∈ ΣIA2) ∧ Pre ≡ Pre1 ∧ Post ≡ Post2
such that Pre1 ⇒ Pre2 ∧ Post2 ⇒ Post1
Illegal states are the states at which the shared actions do not synchronize. We
distinguish two diﬀerent cases: (i) a component requires a shared action which
is not provided by the environment, or (ii) they synchronize on a shared action
between them but the required action and the provided one are not compatible at
the semantic level.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Given two composable interface automata A1 and A2, the set of
illegal states Illegal(A1,A2) ⊆ S1 × S2 of A1 ⊗ A2 is deﬁned by {(q1, q2) ∈ SA1 ×
S2 | ∃ a ∈ Shared(A1, A2). such that the following conditions hold } .
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⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a ∈ ΣO1 (q1) ∧ a 
∈ ΣI2(q2)
∨
(a ∈ ΣO1 (q1) ∧ a ∈ ΣI2(q2)
∧
(Pre1 
⇒ Pre2) ∨ (Post2 
⇒ Post1))
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
or
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a ∈ ΣO2 (q2) ∧ a 
∈ ΣI1(q1)
∨
(a ∈ ΣO2 (q2) ∧ a ∈ ΣI1(q1)
∧
(Pre2 
⇒ Pre1) ∨ (Post1 
⇒ Post2))
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The set of illegal states in the product A1⊗A2 describes the possibility that one of
the two automata may produce an output action that is an input action of the other,
but it is not accepted. In our contribution, we extend the previous deﬁnition by the
possibility that, for some states (q1, q2) in the set of illegal states, an output action
issued from q1 in A1 can be synchronized with the same action enabled as input at q2
in A2 but the precondition of the output action does not imply the the precondition
of the input action or its post-condition is not implied by the post-condition of the
input one.
Compatible states, denoted by Comp(A1,A2), are states from which the en-
vironment can prevent entering illegal states. The compatibility can be deﬁned
diﬀerently, A1 and A2 are compatible iﬀ their initial state is compatible.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Given two composable interface automata A1 and A2. The com-
postion A1 ‖ A2 is an interface automaton deﬁned by: (i) SA1‖A2 = Comp(A1,A2),
(ii) the initial state is IA1‖A2 = IA1⊗A2 ∩ Comp(A1,A2), (iii) ΣA1‖A2 = ΣA1⊗A2,
and (iv) the set of transitions is δA1‖A2 = δA1⊗A2 ∩ (Comp(A1,A2) × PreA1⊗A2 ×
ΣA1‖A2 × PostA1⊗A2 × Comp(A1,A2)).
In this approach, the veriﬁcation of the compatibility between a component C1 and
a component C2 is obtained by verifying the compatibility between their interface
automata A1 and A2.Therefore, one verify if there is a helpful environment where
it is possible to assemble correctly the components C1 and C2. So, one suppose the
existence of such environment which accepts all the output actions of the automaton
of the product A1 ×A2, and which do no not call any input actions in A1 ×A2.
In order to verify the compatibility between two components C1 and C2, it is
necessary to verify of the compatibility between their respective interface automata
A1 and A2. So, one verify if there is a helpful environment (other components)
where it is possible to assemble correctly the components C1 and C2. So, one
suppose the existence of such environment which accepts all the output actions of
the automaton of the product A1 ×A2, and which do no not call any input actions
in A1 ×A2.
Remark 3.5 The veriﬁcation steps in this approach are the same as the ones pre-
sented in the section 2.1.1(the same steps as in [1]). However, in our approach we
consider the action semantics in :
• the interface automata deﬁnition,
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• the product of two interface automata,
• the deﬁnition of the illegal states.
Consequently, our approach does not increase the linear complexity of the veri-
ﬁcation algorithm.
4 The CyCab case study
Several approaches have been proposed to study the concept of CyCab [11]. The
CyCab car is a new electrical means of transportation conceived essentially for free-
standing transport services. It is totally manipulated by a computer system and it
can be driven automatically according to many modes.
Vehicle
position!
halt?
far?
emergency?
reset!
Station
position?
halt!
far!
Emergency
Halt
emergency!
reset?
Starter
start!
start?
Fig. 1. A UML-like model of the CyCab components.
The goal of the CyCab car system design is to allow for users the displacement of the
vehicle from one station to another. As an illustration of its concept, we consider
the following requirements and functionalities of the CyCab car and its environment:
(i) a CyCab has and appropriate road where stations are equipped by sensors, (ii)
the driving of the CyCab is guided by information received from the station allowing
to position of the CyCab from the stations, (iii) there is no obstacle in the roads,
(vi) the vehicle has a starter and also an emergency halt button.
The CyCab car and its environment can be seen as an abstract system composed
of four components: the vehicle, the emergency halt button, the starter, and the
station. The Figure 1 represents the UML 2 component model of our system. The
emergency halt button can be activated at every moment during the running of
the vehicle. It is speciﬁed by sending a signal emergency!. The starter allows the
starting of the vehicle. The station is materialized by a sensor that receives signals
position? from the vehicle to know its position. The station sends as consequence
a signal far! or halt! to the vehicle to indicate if it is far from the station or not.
Assume that Av is the interface automaton associated to the component vehicle
and V = { carstrd, isknpos, isacstr, isrcstn, isnuldist } be the set of ﬁve boolean
variables used to deﬁne pre and post-conditions of actions.
2 The component diagram showed in Figure 1 do not respect exactly the UML 2 notation. It is simply used
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Fig. 2. The IAs Av and As of the Vehicle and the Station
The variable carstrd indicates if the vehicle is started or not, the variable isknpos in-
dicates if the vehicle knows its position from the station, isacstr equals to true when
the starter is active, isrcstn equals to true when the station is reached, and ﬁnally the
variable isnuldist indicates if the distance between the vehicle and the station is null
or not. The automaton Av is given by the tuple 〈Sv, Iv,ΣIv,ΣOv ,ΣHv , P rev, Postv, δv〉
where
• Prev = {V PrH, V PrS, V PrE, V PrF, V PrP, V PrR} where
· V PrH ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isrcstn = false ∧ isknpos = true ∧ isnuldist = true;
· V PrS ≡ isknpos = false ∧ carstrd = false ∧ isacstr = true;
· V PrE ≡ carstrd = true;
· V PrF ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isrcstn = false ∧ isknpos = true ∧ isnuldist = false;
· V PrP ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isknpos = false;
· V PrR ≡ carstrd = false ∧ isacstr = false;
• Postv = {V PsH, V PsS, V PsE, V PsF, V PsP, V PsR} where
· V PsH ≡ carstrd = false ∧ isrcstn = true;
· V PsS ≡ carstrd = true;
· V PsE ≡ carstrd = false ∧ isacstr = false;
· V PsF ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isrcstn = false;
· V PsP ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isknpos = true;
· V PsR ≡ isacstr = true.
The automaton As is given by the tuple 〈Qs, Is,ΣOs ,ΣHs , P res, Posts, δs〉 where
• Pres = {SPrP, SPrH, SPrF} where:
· SPrP ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isknpos = false;
· SPrH ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isrcstn = false ∧ isknpos = true;
· SPrF ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isrcstn = false ∧ isknpos = true;
• Posts = {SPsP, SPsH, SPsF} where:
· SPsP ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isknpos = true;
· SPsH ≡ carstrd = false ∧ isrcstn = true ∧ isacstr = true;
· SPsF ≡ carstrd = true ∧ isrcstn = false;
to clarify the CyCab system
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The composition of the two interfaces Av and As is possible because the set
Shared(Av,As) = {position, halt, far} 
= ∅ and they are composable. The syn-
chronized product between them as shown in the ﬁgure 3, have as pre and post
conditions of operations Prev⊗s = {PrS, PrP, PrH,PrF, PrE, PrR} and Postv⊗s
= {PsS, PsP, PsH,PsF, PsE, PsR} where
• PrP ≡ V PrP if V PrP ⇒ SPrP , PrH ≡ SPrH if SPrH ⇒ V PrH, PrF ≡
SPrF if SPrF ⇒ V PrF , PrS ≡ V PrS, PrE ≡ V PrE, and PrR ≡ V PrR;
• PsP ≡ SPsP if SPsP ⇒ V PsP , PsH ≡ V PsH if V PsH ⇒ SPsH, PsF ≡
V PsF if V PsF ⇒ SPsF , PrS ≡ V PsS, PrE ≡ V PsE, and PrR ≡ V PsR.
We compute the synchronized product automaton
11
21
32
41
42
12
PrS,start?,PsS
position;
PrE,emergency?,PsE
far;
PrH,halt;,VPsH  SPsH
emergency?
reset!
PrR,reset!,PsP
PrP,position;,PsP
PrF,far;,PsF
Fig. 3. Illegal states in the product Vehicle⊗Station
After computing the set of illegal states in the product, we obtain the set
Illegal(Av,As) = {32, 12}. The state 32 is an illegal state because from the state 3 in
the automaton Vehicle, the postcondition of the input shared action, halt?, do not
imply the postcondition of the corresponding output action, halt!, from the state 2
in the component Station (V PsH  SPsH). In fact, the component Vehicle in-
puts the actions halt which provokes strictly the vehicle halt, while the component
Station solicits an action halt which provokes the the vehicle halt and the station
reach.
Next, we compute by performing a backward reachability analysis from Illegal
states which traverses only internal and output steps, all states thus reachable. The
resulting set is {11, 21, 42} and so the set of unreachable states is {41}. Finally,
we remove all incompatible and unreachable states {11, 21, 42, 32, 12, 41} and from
the product automaton to obtain their composite automaton Av ‖ As. The set
of remaining states is empty then, the two interfaces Vehicle and Station are not
compatible.
Remark 4.1 If we apply the approach proposed by L.Alfaro and T.Henzinger [1]
on the same use case, we can detect a compatibility between the components Vehicle
and Station, which is contrasted by considering the semantics of the action halt.
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5 Conclusion and perspectives
The proposed work in this paper is a methodology to analyze the compatibility
between component interfaces. We are inspired by the method proposed by L. Al-
faro and T. Henzinger where interfaces are described by protocols modeled by I/O
automata . We improved these automata by pre and post conditions of component
actions in order to handle the action semantics in the veriﬁcation of interface com-
patibility. This veriﬁcation is made up of two steps. The ﬁrst determines if two
components are composables or not by checking some conditions on the actions fea-
sibility by considering their semantics. The second aims is to detect inconsistencies
between the sequences of action calls given by communicating protocols. This phase
is obtained by considering the synchronized product of interface automata. These
results are applied on the case study of the autonomous vehicle CyCab.
In this context, we are interesting for two research directions. The ﬁrst consists
in implementing a veriﬁcation tool which takes into account pre and post conditions
of actions to check compatibility between interfaces. The second concerns composite
components and their reﬁnement to deﬁne under which conditions a set of assembled
components satisﬁes constraints of the composite component.
References
[1] L. Alfaro and T. A. Henzinger. Interface automata. In 9 th Annual Aymposium on Foundations of
Software Engineering, FSE, pages 109-120. ACM Press, 2001.
[2] L. Alfaro and T. A. Henzinger. Interface-based design. Engineering Theories of Softwareintensive
Systems (M. Broy, J. Gruenbauer, D. Harel, and C.A.R. Hoare, eds.), NATO Science Series :
Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry, 195 :83-104, 2005.
[3] Robert Allen and David Garlan. A formal basis for architectural connection. ACM Transactions on
Software Engineering and Methodology, 6(3): 213-249, July 1997.
[4] Pascal Andr, Gilles Ardourel, and Christian Attiogb. Behavioural Veriﬁcation of Service Composition.
In ICSOCWorkshop on Engineering Service Compositions,WESC05, pages 77-84, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, 2005. IBM Research Report RC 23821.
[5] J.-P. Etienne and S. Bouzefrane. Vers une approche par composants pour la modlisation dapplications
temps rel. In (MOSIM06) 6me Confrence Francophone de Modlisation et Simulation, pages 1-10, Rabat,
2006. Lavoisier.
[6] Jeﬀ Magee, Jeﬀ Kramer, and Dimitra Giannakopoulou. Behaviour analysis of software architectures. In
WICSA1 : Proceedings of the TC2 First Working IFIP Conference on Software Architecture (WICSA1),
pages 35-50, Deventer, The Netherlands, The Netherlands, 1999. Kluwer, B.V.
[7] Nenad Medvidovic and Richard N. Taylor. A classiﬁcation and comparison framework for software
architecture description languages. Software Engineering, 26(1): 70-93, 2000.
[8] S. Moisan, A. Ressouche, and J. Rigault. Behavioral substitutability in component frameworks : A
formal approach, 2003.
[9] Becker Steﬀen, Overhage Sven, and Reussner Ralf. Classifying software component interoperability
errors to support component adaption. In Crnkovic Ivica, Staﬀord Judith, Schmidt Heinz, and Wallnau
Kurt, editors, Component Based Software Engineering, 7th International Symposium, CBSE 2004,
Edinburgh, UK, Proceedings, pages 68-83. Springer, 2004.
[10] C. Szyperski. Component Software. ACM Press, Addison-Wesley, 1999.
[11] Baille Grard, Garnier Philippe, Mathieu Herv and Pissard-Gibollet Roger. The INRIA Rhoˆne-Alpes
Cycab. INRIA technical report, Avril 1999.
[12] N. Lynch and M. Tuttle, Hierarchical Correctness Proofs for Distributed Algorithms, 6th ACM Symp
on Principles of Distributed Computing,137-151, ACM Press,1987.
S. Chouali et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 238 (2010) 3–13 13
